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This section of the Journal provides notes on recent cases, pending or
newly-enacted legislation, and other current legal materials. The Updates
section is designed to aid the practitioner in relating the Journal articles to
the daily practice of labor and employment law.
Supreme Court holds that determination of whether an individual's
physical or mental impairment substantially limits major life activity, so as
to satisfy the Americans with Disabilities Act's definition of "disability",
must take into consideration medication or other corrective devices that
mitigate that individual's impairment. Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 119
S.Ct. 1752 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2133
(1999).
In a pair of opinions by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Supreme
Court decided by a vote of 7-2 that evaluating people in their uncorrected
state "is an impermissible interpretation" of the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"). In so ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the position taken
by two federal agencies and eight of the nine federal courts of appeals that
have addressed the issue.
In Sutton, the lead opinion, the Supreme Court said that "looking at
the Act as a whole, it is apparent that if a person is taking measures to
correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of
those measures-both positive and negative-must be taken into account
when judging whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a major life
activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act." Following this line of
reasoning, the Court concluded that two nearsighted pilots, whose vision is
normal when wearing corrective lenses, are not disabled for ADA
purposes. The pilots, twin sisters, alleged that United Air Lines
discriminated against them because of their myopia. United denied them
employment because their uncorrected vision did not meet the airline's
requirement of 20/100 vision or better.
In reaching its decision, the Court focused solely on statutory
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language. The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
The Court said that because Section 12102(2)(A) uses the phrase
"substantially limits" in the present indicative verb form, "we think the
language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently-not
potentially or hypothetically-substantively limited in order to demonstrate
a disability."
Supreme Court holds that plaintiffs suing under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 need not show egregious or outrageous discriminatory
conduct to be entitled to punitive damages, but only that the employer knew
that its actions might be in violation of federal law. Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (1999).
In June, the Supreme Court held that punitive damages may be
awarded in cases under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII")
based solely on the employer's state of mind. There is no additional duty
to demonstrate that the employer engaged in "egregious" misconduct. The
Court held further, however, that employers may not be held vicariously
liable for punitive damages based on managerial employees' actions if
employers have made good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
The Court's opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor settled a circuit
split on the standard of conduct needed for punitive damages. The vote on
that issues was 7-2, while the issue of vicarious liability was decided by a
narrower margin of 5-4.
The Supreme Court noted that the provision of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act that made punitive damages available in Title VII suits limits punitive
damage awards to cases of "intentional discrimination." Eligibility for
punitive damages is further qualified by requiring that the employer must
have acted "with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual." The Court held that this
standard addresses the defendant's state of mind, rather than the degree of
his misconduct. While "egregious or outrageous acts may serve as
evidence supporting an inference of the requisite 'evil motive,"' such acts
need not be shown "independent of the employer's state of mind."
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The Supreme Court holds that application for, or receipt of benefits
under the Social Security Disability Insurance program ("SSDI") neither
estops action under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") nor
erects a strong presumption against the ADA claim. Cleveland v. Policy
Management Sys. Corp., 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999).
The SSDI program provides benefits to persons who are "unable" to
do their "previous work" and "cannot... engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." In May,
the Supreme Court held that a person who applies for or receives SSDI
benefits is not automatically barred from suing an employer under the ADA
based on a claim that the applicant or recipient could perform essential
functions of his or her prior job with reasonable accommodation. The
decision unanimously settled a circuit split on the issue.
The Court further held that the application for, or receipt of, SSDI
benefits does not erect a strong presumption against the ADA claim. The
Court did make clear, however, that in order to block a summary
judgement motion to dismiss an ADA suit the applicant or recipient must
explain how the SSDI claim is consistent with the ADA claim.
The Court stated that despite the apparent conflict between the
statutory language of the Social Security Act and the ADA, claims made
simultaneously under each Act "do not inherently conflict to the point
where courts should apply a special negative presumption." The ADA
defines a qualified individual to include a disabled person who can perform
the essential functions of a job "with reasonable accommodation." In
contrast, the Court pointed out, when the Social Security Administration
determines whether an individual is disabled for purposes of the SSDI
program, it does not take the possibility of reasonable accommodation into
account. An applicant for SSDI benefits need not even refer to the
possibility of reasonable accommodation. Therefore, an ADA suit
claiming that the plaintiff can perform the job with reasonable
accommodation may prove to be consistent with an SSDI claim that the
plaintiff could not do his or her own job or any other job without
reasonable accommodation.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals holds that an employee's execution
of an agreement to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims
does not bar the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
from suing for monetary and injunctive relief on that employee's behalf.
EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the EEOC
may sue for monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of an employee who
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agreed to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims.
According to the court, Congress gave the EEOC "the right to
represent an interest broader than that of a particular individual when it
exercises its authority to sue" under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The court held that "to empower a private individual to take away this
congressional mandate, by entering into arbitration agreements or other
contractual arrangements, would grant that individual the ability to govern
whether and when the EEOC may protect the public interest and further our
national initiative against employment discrimination, and to thereby undo
the work of Congress in its 1972 amendments."
The majority opinion states that "while the EEOC acts, in some
respects, as the representative of an aggrieved individual when it sues on
that individual's behalf, the EEOC never ceases to represent the public
interest as well." The court also stated that the public interest outweighs
the interest in enforcing the employee's private promise to arbitrate against
his employer. The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit on this
issue.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals holds that there is no presumption
that workers' life and medical insurance benefits continue for life, thereby
declining to follow the "Yard-Man" inference. International Union v.
Skinner Engine Co., 1999 WL 596345 (3d Cir. Aug. 10, 1999).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that there is no
presumption that collectively-bargained life and medical insurance benefits
are vested. The Court declined to follow the "Yard-Man" inference which
creates a presumption that parties to a collective bargaining agreement
intend retired workers' welfare benefits to continue for life. This doctrine
originated in the 6th Circuit and was adopted by the 1st, 4th and llth
Circuits. The court joined the 5th and 8th Circuits in declining to adopt the
presumption.
The court stated in it's opinion that a "presumption of lifetime benefits
[does not exist] in the context of employee welfare benefits." The Court
looked to ERISA's elaborate vesting requirements for pension plans and
pointed out that "it does not require automatic vesting of welfare benefit
plans." There are no vesting requirements for employee welfare plans
"because Congress determined that to require the vesting of those ancillary
benefits would seriously complicate the administration and increase the
cost of plans whose primary function is to provide retirement income."
Additionally, the court found that the employer was not liable for
breaching its statutorily-imposed fiduciary duty. Contrary to the retirees'
argument, the employer did not have an affirmative duty of disclosure
which would require it to inform its employees that their welfare benefits
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were not vested. Although the employer knew that the retirees believed
that their benefits were vested, because the employer did not (1)
affirmatively make representations to the effect that retiree benefits were
vested, (2) stand silent when specifically asked about the duration of retiree
benefits, or (3) create the misimpression in the minds of the retirees; the
employer was under no obligation to correct the employees' mistaken
belief.
